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Making Connections: 
An Essay on Creativity i n  Science and Poetry 
B. R. Tilghman 
l mean to speak 
Of that interminable building reared 
By observation of affinities 
In objects where no brotherhood exists 
To common minds. 
(Wordsworth, The Prelude, II, 40 1 -405 )  
I 
ln the tenth book of his Republic, toward the end of the discussion of 
the imitative arts, Plato alludes to a long,standing quarrel between 
poetry and philosophy . 1  If we are correct in locating the origins of 
philosophy in the first quarter of the sixth century before Christ, then 
the quarrel had been going on for about two hundred years when 
Plato called attention to it. In one form or another the quarrel has 
been going on ever since. 
· The reason for the quarrel in the first place is worth thinking about. 
To be sure, it grew out of a conception of poetry that is rather differ, 
ent from the one that the last four hundred years of English poetry, or 
French poetry for that matter, has made us familiar with, but by 
reflecting on that difference our own modern conception of poetry 
can be brought into sharper focus and the contemporary versions of 
the long,standing quarrel can be better understood. 
Poetry played a different role in the lives of the Greeks than it does 
in our lives. Homer and Hesiod were the teachers of Hellas and it was 
from their verses that children learned their earliest lessons and grown 
men drew the words that swayed the assembly in debate and heart, 
ened troops in battle. In the absence of religious scriptures it was 
from Homer and Hesiod that the Greeks learned about the gods and 
what the world is like and how it got that way, how the camel got it's 
hump and how come armadillos; it was from the Homeric heroes that 
Greek lads took their models of moral behavior and it was Aeschylus 
and Sophocles who showed the disastrous consequences of hubris and 
the religious indigestion that follows upon having one's children for 
dinner. 
This poetic stew of mythology, cosmology, and moral didacticism 
was challenged by the new developments of the sixth century out of 
which grew philosophy and science. In their origins philosophy and 
science were indistinguishable as part of a single intellectual enterprise 
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of providing rational ,  naturalistic descriptions and explanations of the 
world and its phenomena and it wasn't long before representatives of 
the new breed were making unflattering remarks about poets ; Heracli­
tus, for example, claimed that Hesiod didn't know Day and Night and 
Xenophanes charged both Homer and Hesiod with attributing 
improper behavior to the gods. Thus poetry as the repository of 
mythology, religion, and traditional mores found itself in competition 
with the new science over who could best describe the world and tell 
how it got to be like it is. Early in its career this new science could 
offer little improvement over the theogonies and cosmogonies of tra­
ditional mythology and F. M. Cornford may well have been right 
when he contended that the early Ionian cosmological speculation was 
simply taken over from that traditional mythology with only the 
names of the characters changed.2 Science, however, was to develop 
far beyond its beginnings out of Greek mythology and when it comes 
to a matter of describing the world and finding out what it is really 
like there would appear to be no contest at all between science and 
poetry, in that race imagery, metaphor, and their like simply cannot 
compete with microscopes, telescopes and theirs. 
If poetry was going to counter this advantage that science held, it 
was going to have to do it by shifting the ground of the quarrel for it 
could never meet science on its home grounds. We find the germ of 
such counter moves in much of the poetry and poetic theory of the 
romantic period. Typical of this romantic response was Words­
worth 's and typical of Wordsworth3 were the lines: "One impulse 
from a vernal wood/ Can teach you more of man,/ Of moral evil and 
of good,/ Than all the sages can . "  Romanticism was born, at least in 
part, out of a disillusionment with the "Age of Reason" and the 
French revolution that many supposed to be the consequence of rea­
son made politically incarnate. While the storming of the Bastille may 
have heralded a dawn in which it was bliss to be alive, by forenoon 
the weather had turned pretty drear and drizzly and reason and its 
offspring, science, were in disrepute, at least in some q uarters. The 
romantic move, then, was to claim that there is a kind of k nowledge 
other than that provided by reason and science, a kind no doubt 
superior, that is to be got through poetry. Observations and experi­
ments that murder to dissect and meter sticks with their mournful 
numbers must give way to impulses from vernal woods and the hail­
ing of blythe spirits. The romantics had invented the idea of intuitive 
knowledge. 
The supposition that there is a special kind of intuitive k nowledge 
was widely exploited by philosophers in the latter nineteenth century 
and early twentieth century. Bergson made intuition the mode of 
awareness that puts us in touch with the creative impulse that makes 
the world go round and Croce turned a version of intuition into the 
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corner stone of his theory of art. Philosophers such as Bergson and 
Croce tended to hold a purely conventionalist view of science. They 
thought of scientific theories as somewhat arbitrary symbolic repres­
entations of phenomena that may have some justification in practical 
affairs, but have little , if any, connection with the ultimate nature of 
things. Less sophisticated modern minds often have a tendency to 
hold a more Baconian view of science, seeing it essentially as an exer­
cise in fact gathering or , more likely,  fact grubbing. In such a view the 
Laws and theories of science are no more than inductive generaliza­
tions arrived at more or less mechanically or, these days, computerly 
from the data grubbed up by the under-laborers. At any rate, despite 
which of these views predominates, science suffers by comparison 
with art and poetry for there presumably is no room in science for the 
kind of creative activity which is the mark of the true artist. 
To be sure, the greatest part of the day to day work of science is 
carried out by its under-laborers" who busy themselves with arranging 
laboratory apparatus, checking the experimental results of others, 
refining measuremef\ts, and generally finding out what happens when . 
. . . A closer look , however, at what scientists really do when they 
construct theories based on careful studies in the history of science 
makes abundantly clear that the Baconian picture of scientific activity 
is not only hopelessly inadequate, but is down-right misleading as an 
account of a science such as physics.5 Although much day to day 
work may suggest the Baconian picture, it is just not true of what have 
come to be called scientific revolutions by means of which science has 
advanced. Here there is indeed room for creativity. 
Nor is there any reason to deny a place for creativity in a purely 
conventionalist account of science. If a scientific theory is a human 
invention and not merely a recording of what is already there, then 
science is j ust as creative as a work of fiction. Plato denied a creative 
component to art and poetry by denigrating the artist as a mere imita­
tor who does no more than hold a mirror up to nature. A certain 
conception of science could be described in the same way; the scien­
tist merely holds the mirror up to nature in describing the patterns of 
phenomena to be found there while adding nothing of his own. If 
subsequent theory redeemed poetry from the unworthy state that 
Plato assigned it to, parity of reasoning demands we do no less for 
science. The denigration of science at the hands of the vitalists and the 
idealists was not a function of their conventionalist picture of it; it 
was, rather, a function of their views about ultimate reality. It was one 
of their theoretical tenets that ultimate reality was such that it resisted 
scientific description and, hence, science could count for naught in 
any ultimate reckoning of things. 
I intend to dismiss all this talk of ultimate reality as the result of a 
species of intellectual confusion. Whether science does or does not 
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describe ultimate reality I do not believe to be a question at all. but a 
piece of philosopher's nonsense. And the same holds for the analcr 
gous question whether art and poetry put us into contact with the 
innermost recesses of reality. These charges, made dogmatically here, 
want arguing for in detail, but that must be reserved for another place. 
The burden of this paper is considerably more modest. I want to 
investigate one aspect of creativity in science and one aspect of crea, 
tivity in poetry and to point out in what ways they are alike and in 
what ways they are di fferent and then to see whether in this we have 
learned anything useful about our topic. 
First, however, a few general remarks about the notion of creativity 
are in order. From time to time phi losophers have attempted to define 
creativity and to fix the conditions that must be satisfied for someone 
or his accomplishments to be called creative. There is a consideration 
that suggests this attempt may be fruitless. We may be tempted to 
suppose that one mark of creativity is origi nality, newness, or novelty. 
We are inclined to believe that a creative accomplishment is some, 
th ing new and different from anything that has cortte before. While 
there is surely something right about that requirement, it borders 
dangerously upon the trivial. A child makes mud pies and there is 
nothing new in that, but have they been made in exactly chac shape 
before? The lady next door paints by number, but would we call her 
creative because she fills in each space with, say, the compliment of 
the color called for by the instructions? Mere difference from what 
has gone before doesn't seem enough to set off creativity. Doubtless 
some trivial aspect can always be found in which everything differs 
from every other. 
It seems to me that the word "creative" functions primarily as a 
value term and that a creative artist is a good artist and that a creative 
scientist is a good scientist. That way of putting it is a little too easy 
because it doesn't discriminate between the kind of artist we think of 
as creative and the merely competent illustrator or the truly creative 
scientist and the merely competent under,laborer. "Creative" is cer, 
tainly a stronger notion than "competent". It may well be true that we 
reserve the description "creative" for those cases in which someone 
has come up with something new, but that something must be worth­
while, worth coming up with: a new scientific theory or concept that 
leads to a better understanding of phenomena, a new way of painting 
that leads us to see things afresh, or a new way of using words that 
produces a new kind of poetic delight. Here we really need specific 
examples that illustrate the way we use the word rather than generali­
zations that will more than likely be false to some important cases. 
We can mention Einstein's relativity physics that began to make sense 
of the recalcitrant behaviour of the speed of light, the impressionists 
delighting us with forms dissolved into shimmering color, and Hop-
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kins catching chis morning's minion of elusive alliteration. And this 
helps us understand why so many of the attempts of professional 
pedagogy to encourage "creativity" in children result only in embar­
rassing irony. 
Ir is because of this connection with value that a rheoretical defin­
tion of creativity, or even a general theory of it, will probably never 
be forthcoming. At any rate, it will have to wait upon a general theory 
of artistic value, a general rheory of what makes good science, and a 
general theory of value in every other activity that can be described as 
creative. And even if such rheories could be satisfactorily formulated, 
there is no guarantee that the elements in each one that we call crea­
tive would have the kind of common denominator out of which a 
general theory of creativity could be built. Needless to say, we have 
none of that sore of theory, but I don ' t  see that as any shortcoming. 
We can raise all the questions that want raising and set out to answer 
them on a case by case basis and that is all we really need to do. 
II  
The example of creativity in science that I want to call attention to 
belongs to the seventeenth century.6 It was not rhe product of any 
single person: Kepler contributed to it and so did Galileo although the 
ke¥ figure was certainly the incomparable Mr. Newton. How many of 
the crucial insights can actually be attributed to Newton rather than 
others, I don't know and for my purposes it doesn't really matter. 
The important thing is that over a period of time something got done 
and I want to try to provide a way of understanding what that some­
thing was. 
One task of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century was 
to provide a new theory of motion, a theory of mechanics and espe­
cially dynamics, to replace the Aristotelian physics that had come to 
dominate the scientific thought of the later middle ages. It had been 
known for a long time that Aristotle's principles were woefully inade­
quate, but there was as yet no general theory of motion to replace 
them. Aristotle has postulated that the furniture of the world is com­
posed of five elements, earth, water, air, fi re, and aether . Each of these 
elements was assigned its own natural motion, that of earth and water 
being staight line motion toward the center of everything, that of air 
and fire straight line motion away from the center, while aether was 
assigned an eternal circular motion around the center. Since aether 
was the stuff which the heavens were made of, the sun, moon, stars, 
and planets all moved eternally in circular paths while everything else 
moved in straight lines toward a natural terminus. This theory of the 
elements and their natural motions thus entailed a sharp distinction 
between the physics of the heavens and that of the sublunary regions, 
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that is, the earth and its atmosphere. 
If we can put aside at least some measure of the scientific awareness 
we all share and look at the movements of things with a naive eye, we 
sec an infinite variety. Heavy objects drop straight down when they 
fall, but feathers and leaves flutter in the breeze. A weight can swing 
bade and forth at the end of a string or describe a circle when whirled 
about your head. A thrown ball describes a parabolic path and, to 
borrow a bit from the science we set aside, we are told that planetary 
orbits are elliptical. And perhaps we shouldn't even try to describe 
the alarums and excursions of the ball in the pin ball machine. 
To the naive eye that we have assumed these motions are all quite 
different and apparently have nothing in common. Even at the stage 
of sophistication that subjects their paths to geometrical analysis little, 
if any, is revealed that they could have in common. Straight lines, cir, 
des, parabolas, and elli� are different curves and are plotted from 
different formulae. One of the most important aims of scientific ch� 
rizing is co bring what is an apparendy diverse and disparate range of 
phenomena under a common explanation so that it can be seen to 
exemplify a set of common principles and thereby to show that there 
really is something in common despite the apparent diversity. Thus 
science can be understood, in part, as a kind of seeking out and show, 
ing of connection and one important aspect of creativity in the scien, 
rifle enterprise is the ability of the scientist to. see unsuspected connec, 
tions. In the case of motion the connections could not be revealed by 
any mere catalogue of the phenomena or by any process of Baconian 
induction performed upon the entries in the catalogue. There is 
nothing in the idea of such a catalogue even to suggest that there are 
connections to be looked for. 
Aristotelian physics did not go very far coward establishing a unity 
in all that variety. The theory of natural motions of the elements had 
little clear application to the actual motions of observed objects,,it 
was, for example, notoriously unable to account for projectile 
motion--and astronomy remained with no logical connection to ter­
restrial physics. It was taken for granted by Aristotelian science that 
there was no connection to be sought between terrestrial and celestial 
motion. It remained, of course, for the seventeenth century to make 
the connections and to demonstrate that the motion of a falling body, 
a pendulum, a projectile, and a planet all do have something in com­
mon. Early in the century Kepler had shown that planetary orbits 
were elliptical and that the angular velocity of a planet about the sun 
varied in regular ways in the course of that orbit. Galileo had worked 
out the concept of gravitational acceleration to explain the behavior of 
falling bodies and of pendulums and had also worked out a primitive 
version of the concept of inertia. With these two concepts he was able 
to explain the fact that a projectile follows a parabolic path by deriv-
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ing the curve as the resultant of two vectors, a constant inertial vector 
and a continually increasing vector representing gravitational accelera­
tion. Yet terrestrial mechanics and celestial mechanics were still two 
logically independent sciences. I t  was, as we all know, the incompara­
ble Mr . Newton who took the final step and put it all together. New­
ton's great achievement was the demonstration that all the forms of 
motion investigated by Galileo and Kepler could be explained in 
terms of his three laws of motion together with the law of gravitation 
that supplied the forces to account for the accelerations. 
We know that this seventeenth century achievement in mechanics 
and dynamics was the work of a number of indivduals although New­
ton certainly has to be the major figure. How much of the ultimate 
synthesis was his own work and how much must be set down to the 
insight of others, I am not concerned to sort out. As I suggested 
before, it is not essential to my thesis that the important connections 
were seen by any single individual; what is important is the fact that 
during the seventeenth century there was a development in science 
that can properly be described as creative and that took the form of 
identifying a series of connections between what had before been 
thought to be an altogether disparate collection of phenomena and, 
furthermore, proved to be extraordinarily fruitful both for our under­
standing of nature and for subsequent research and scientific 
development. 
Ill  
Emily Dickinson wrote a poem that goes like this. 
I like to see it lap the miles, 
And lick the valleys up, 
And stop to feed itself at tanks; 
And then, prodigious, step 
Around a pile of mountains, 
And, supercilious, peer 
In shanties by the side of roads; 
And then a quarry pare 
To fit its sides, and crawl between, 
Complaining all the while 
8
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In horrid, hooting stanza; 
Then chase itself downhill 
And neigh like Boanerges; 
Then, punctual as a star, 
Stop-- docile and omnipotent-­
At its own stable door. 
The poem is based on an extended comparison between a railroad 
locomotive and a great beast that laps up distance, feeds, peers, 
complains, neighs like a son of thunder, then stands docilely as if to 
accept the bridle. This, I suggest, is another example of ferreting out 
unsuspected connections and in this respect there is an interesting 
parallel between poetry and science. 
Metaphors, similes, imagery, and symbols all serve as vehicles of 
poetic connection. The connection can emerge in the moment of a 
single line like the bloom on some fair maid's cheek or inform an 
entire poem as in the example from Emily Dickinson, or it can be as 
oddly idiosyncratic as Rimbaud finding the vowel "A" black and 
buzzing with flies. The connection can be embodied in a single symbol 
such as the unicorn with the broken horn in Laura's pitiful little glass 
menagerie which symbolizes purity, fantasy, withdrawal from reality, 
and both shattered limbs and shattered dreams and which bri ngs 
together in a single image the concerns and perceptions of Amanda 
and Tom as well as Laura herself. One sometimes effective poetic 
device is to locate the connection in elements that seem to be almost 
polar opposites and logically incapable of being brought together. 
Cleanth Brooks surely went too far in his contention that the kind of 
paradox characteristic of metaphysical conceit is the essence of poetic 
language.7 His is a fascinating way of bringing the variety of candles, 
flies, lovers, and the two being one who die to rise the same into a 
literary unity, but not all poetic connection trades on paradox; Emily 
Dicki nson does not generally do that sort of thing although the 
yoking of docility and omnipotence comes close to being such a 
conceit. 
One important way in which science and art are alike is, then, in 
the making of connections. Are there any others? I think so. In both 
areas the connections can have consequences. Scientific connections 
allow us to explain phenomena and in addition to their explanatory 
power they often permit the prediction of phenomena. This is 
eminently true of Newtonian mechanics. With it we can calculate the 
trajectory of a projectile, predict the position of a planet, and loft a 
communications satellite into orbit. The practical applications of all 
that are enormous. 
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The consequences and implications of artistic and literary connec­
tions are of a rather different sort. Many are purely artistic. With 
respect to Donne's "The Canonization", for example, Brooks showed 
how once the fundamental comparison established by the phoenix 
image is grasped, the rest of the images fall into place and the entire 
poem makes a kind of sense it could not have made while it remained 
a series of unconnected figures. Sense can sometimes be made of a 
piece of music by showing its connections with other things. Musical 
understanding can follow from pointing out that a certain passage 
must be taken as like an answer to what has gone before, or perhaps 
as like a joke, or that it is a parody of another work. Awareness of 
such connections can guide a musician in playing the work properly 
and with understanding and it can also guide the audience in listening 
to it with understanding. 
There is, however, another kind of consequence of artistic connec­
tion that must be mentioned. In the course of developing a general 
theory of art as metaphor Arthur Danto has recently introduced a 
number of interesting and insightful examples of artistic connections. 
Danto says 
the greatest metaphors of art I believe to be those in 
which the spectator identifies himself with attributes 
of the represented character: and sees his or her life 
in terms of the life depicted: it is oneself as Anna 
Karenina, or Isabell Archer, or Elizabeth Bennett, or 
0: oneself sipping lime tea; in the Marabar Caves; in 
the waters off East Egg; in the Red Chamber . . .  
where the artwork becomes a metaphor for life and 
life is transfigured.8 
The importance of this remark for me does not lie in the support it 
may or may not offer to any general theory of art. It lies, rather, in 
being a reminder of what art can sometimes do. It can illuminate a life 
and it can lead to an understanding of oneself. Art can sometimes say, 
"Thou art the man," and one's own Life is thereby seen differently 
and sometimes changed. 
IV 
After having dwelt at some length upon certain similarities between 
art and science it is time to move on to the differences and to return 
to those ancient and still nagging doubts that the difference may, after 
all, be much more significant than the similarities. Let it be granted 
that science and poetry seek connections. The claim that there is a 
connection between things is not by itself sufficient to establish that 
10
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there is, in fact , such a connection in any particular instance whether 
it be a scientific or a poetical one. We can get right to the trouble, 
some aspect of this issue by aslcing how such claims are verified and 
made good. In the case of the connections hypothesized by Newtonian 
mechanics the answer to the q uestion is relatively simple and straight, 
forward. Each of the trajectories or curves traced by the different 
moving objects previously mentioned can be derived by mathematical 
deduction from the laws of the theory together with appropriate 
information about the mass and initial velocity of the moving object, 
the gravitational and other forces acting on it, and the lilce. This addi, 
tional information about masses , velocities, and forces can be deter, 
mined by empirical measurements. The values thus gotten can replace 
the quantified variables in terms of which the laws are stated and the 
resulting accelerations easily calculated. That the bodies actually move 
in the way thus predicted by the theory can be checked empirically. It 
is by means of the whole process that the claim that the motion of a 
cannon ball and the motion of a planet are significantly similar is 
made good. Those philosophers of science who thought of scientific 
theories as paradigmatically deductive systems were perhaps not far 
wrong. In this instance, at any rate, the connections between the dif, 
ferent phenomena are logical ones to the extent that the relevant 
empirically verifiable descriptions of the phenomena can all be 
deduced from the same set of postulates (the laws ). 
When we loolc at art and poetry, however, all that is different for 
there is nothing that passes for theory, nor, a fortiori, deduction from 
the principles of the theory, nor even empirical verification, in any 
clear sense, of the metaphorical connections. These facts could easily 
lead someone to believe that poetry is essentially humbug and that 
poets fail to establish any real connections between phenomena at all. 
From this perspective what some would call artistic creativity is but 
willful arbitrariness in the use of words: the whole tribe of poets turns 
out to be a tribe of Bunthornes. From another perspective, if one is 
already predisposed toward poetry, the same facts can encourage one 
in the belief that the poet is privy to a kind of knowledge or aware, 
ness of things denied to the philistine scientist and we find ourselves 
back in romantic prattle about intuitions versus intellect. Neither 
perspective is, I think, ultimately justified and at this stage in the dis, 
cussion we should be content merely to note that while there are cer, 
tain similarities between science and poetry, there are also these sal, 
ient differences and refrain from offering any hypotheses to explain 
those differences or to judge them. 
There is still another interesting difference between the two that 
either side in the quarrel could cite to its supposed advantage. Once 
the creative scientific work has been done and the insight locating 
connections between otherwise disparate phenomena has been 
11
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achieved, the task of applying the theory and tracing out the connec­
tions in particular cases can be left to the under-laborers. Once the 
theory has been constructed, the verification of the postulated similar­
ities can be carried out by anyone capable of performing the necessary 
mathematical calculations. The under-laborer does not require the 
same "nose'' for the material that the original scientist does. The 
situation in poetry, by contrast, is significantly different. The poet's 
reader must react in an appropriate way to the poet's comparison; he 
must see the point of it and then find it apt, or, perhaps, clumsy, and 
so on. There are no procedures or devices for verifying a poetic com­
parison as there are for measuring forces, masses, velocities, and 
accelerations. While the poet's image or figure would likely not have 
struck the reader on his own - he is, after all, a reader and not a poet 
- he must be able to realize the connection for himself when it is 
presented to him. There is, however, no guarantee that any reader will 
see the point of likening a locomotive to a fabulous monster; there are 
those for whom talk of supercilious peers and horrid hootings makes 
no contact with cross heads, side rods, and feedwater pumps. This can 
be taken as reinforcing either the charge that poetry lacks any sub­
stance or, contrariwise, the sometime romantic view that the reading 
of poetry is itself a creative act that joins reader to writer in a creative 
consummation devoutly to be wished. 
A s�riking feature of the kind of poetic connections we have been 
talking about is that they seem to demand description by means of the 
preposition "as": Emily Dickinson presented the locomotive as a hor­
rid hooting beast, Donne the lovers as like the phoenix, Rimbaud the 
vowel A as black. One sees oneself as Anna Karenina, or Laura as the 
shattered unicorn. This interesting use of the word "as" has been 
explored in a fascinating manner by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Philo­
sophical Investigations. 9 Wittgenstein introduces this use in an examina­
tion of various forms of visual perception in which the objects of per­
ception are different from what we usually think of as the things we 
see. He talks of seeing a likeness between two faces, of ambiguous fig­
ures such as Jastrow's duck-rabbit which can been seen one time as a 
duck and another as a rabbit, and of formless things that can suddenly 
take on an organization as when we come to see a certain shape in a 
cloud. He refers to these objects of perception as aspects and is con­
cerned to make sense of the kinds of experience we have when an 
aspect is seen to change or a new aspect suddenly dawns on us and to 
exorcise certain philosophical and psychologial theories of mental life 
and perception whose grip upon us produces intellectual confusion. 
What he says about visual experience has obvious application to how 1 
say, music can be heard and to poetic imagery as well. 
Wittgenstein goes on to connect his investigation of seeing one 
thing as something else with certain considerations about the meaning 
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of words. He was especially interested in the idea that one can some­
times experience the meaning of a word and that when we hear or 
read a word it may seem to us to be filled with its meaning or, some­
times, to be drained of its meaning. He reminds us of the familiar 
experience of repeating a word a number of times in rapid succession 
until its sense seems to disintegrate into no more rhan a series of cur­
ious sounds. It is in discussing this phenomenon of experiencing the 
meanin.g of a word that he introduces the idea that a word may be 
used in what he calls a secondary sense. He cites two interesting 
examples of words used in secondary senses. "Given the two ideas 
'fat' and 'lean', would you be inclined to say that Wednesday was fat 
and Tuesday lean, or the other way around?" Wittgenstein opts for 
fat Wednesdays and adds " For me the vowel e is yellow. "1c This latter 
example is obviously reminiscent of Rimbaud although there is 
nothing at all to indicate that Wittgenstein had Rimbaud in mind. 
It is not in order here to explain the many questions and philoso, 
phical concerns that drive Wittgenstein in this part of the Philosophi­
cal ln«!stigati0115 nor to try to sort out the many connections that run 
through this discussion in which he has spun an extraordinarily subtle 
and complex web. 1 1  It is enough for my purposes to borrow some of 
his conclusions and suggestions and apply them to the things we have 
been saying about creativity in order to bring a kind of understanding 
that I hope to be altogether in a spirit that is Wittgenstein's. 
Much of the language of poetry must be understood, I believe, in 
terms of Wittgenstein's notions of seeing one thing as another and 
words having secondary senses. Wittgenstein does not offer us any 
general account of what makes the use of a word a secondary one; he 
offers us only a few examples, but a close look at these reveals several 
characteristic features. ( 1 )  The thing to which the word is applied is 
usually quite different from the things to which it is ordinarily applied 
and may even appear to be of the wrong category to be the subject of 
such a description. A day, for example, is not the kind of thing we 
think of as being either fat or lean. ( 2 )  There need be no similarity 
between the subject of the secondary use and the thing the word usu­
ally describes. There is nothing that Wednesday and a fat man can 
intelligibly be said to have in common nor is a vowel like a colored 
object. (3)  The meaning of the word used in a secondary sense does 
not change under that use. The meaning of nfat" in nfat Wednesday" 
could only be explained by reference to fat men. ( 4) The ability to use 
a word in a secondary sense depends upon the ability to use the word 
in its ordinary (primary) sense. I must know what it is to call a man 
fat in order to be inclined to describe Wednesday that way. (5)  The 
sense of the secondary description cannot be rendered by any para, 
phrase. In no other way could I make the point that Wednesday is fat. 
(6) No causal or psychological explanation is relevant to an under-
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standing of a word used in a secondary sense. ( 7 )  No reason, justifica· 
rion, or criteria can be given for the application of a word used with a 
secondary sense. We call a man fat on the basis of his girth and the 
folds of his flesh, but nothing of the sort can support the description 
of Wednesday as fat. There is, instead, only the inclinacion to use the 
word in that way and, we may note, such uses often appear remark· 
ably firring and apt. 
There is a temptation to dismiss the notion of using a word in a 
secondary sense as merely a curious idio.syncrasy that can't tell us any· 
thing about poetry; successful poetic images are anything but idio.syn· 
cratic. Wittgenstein's examples of talking about the days of the week 
as either fat or lean and ascribing colors to the vowels certainly 
increase that temptation, but a careful look at poetic language reveals, 
I believe, that it can share many characteristics of secondary senses. 
The locomotive neighs like Boanerges. Locomotives, not being anim· 
als, much less horses, are not the sort of thing that either neigh or res· 
train their voices. A locomotive does not resemble a horse in any way 
that justifies or sheds light on the comparison; driving wheels and 
eccentrics are not like hooves and pasterns. The word "neigh" does 
not change its meaning when used of the locomotive. There is no spe· 
cial ferro-engine meaning for the word; after all, the point of usng the 
word was to make a connection between the two. The creation and 
appreciation of the metaphor obviously depends upon knowing about 
horses and being able to use the word of horses. Some piece of psy­
chological theory or bit of causal history may explain why Emily 
Dickinson chose a horse rather than something else as the metaphori· 
cal basis of a poem - we can imagine childhood associations or per­
haps prenatal influences at work - but none of that could explain the 
poetic aptness or force of the metaphor. We, her readers, do not have 
to share her causal history in order to appreciate her images. There 
are criteria of a rough sort that distinguish the horse's neigh from the 
snorts and other noises the creature makes. The dictionary tells us 
that the neigh is the "loud and prolonged cry" of the horse and, 
doubtless, the poet would not be inclined to describe, say, the blow· 
ing off of the cylinder cocks as a neigh unless the noise was reasonably 
uloud and prolonged". Things being as they are, however, "neigh" is 
not a term used to denote one out of the range of possible locomotive 
noises and there are, in fact, no criteria for its application to 
locomotives. 
It is at this point that the whole business of using words in a secon­
dary sense and, perforce, much of the language of poetry cries out for 
explanation. The same demand to explain more prosaic use of words 
where there are often fairly definite criteria for their application does 
not press upon us in the same way. This seems even more true of 
scientific descriptions where we are inclined to think that our scien· 
tific vocabulary is applied on the basis of technical and very precisely 
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specified criteria. The difficulty that we want an explanation to get us 
out of can be better understood by reflecting on a comment of the 
French literary scholar and critic Ren� Etiemble. His detailed study of 
Rimbaud's sonnet " Voyelles" failed to turn up any possible explana­
tion for the poet's intriguing and baffling imagery; no childhood asso­
ciations, appeal to the pseudo-phenomenon of synaesthesia or other 
psychological mechanisms, no other facts of personal or cultural his­
tory were found relevant. He concl udes in this way. 
Why "fl ies", "tents",  "lips", "bugles"? Because the 
poet has seen them. Why has he seen them? Because 
he is a poet. The misforture is that the literary critics, 
vexed by their own sterility, attempt to suppress this 
vision which obeys neither the laws of "l iterary his­
tory "  nor those of "source criticism " .  This original 
symbolism, which it is impossible to reconstruct, to 
formulate in an equation, must be accepted , submit­
ted to. 1 2  
The thing that Eriemble says cannot be explained but must be 
accepted and submitted to we are now in a position to identify as the 
fact that words can have secondary senses, that there is that use of 
language and it is that that makes the poet's vision possible. 
Etiemble's remarks open up two possible directions for our 
thought. The first is that we must be content with merely accepting 
the poetic use of language because we are unable to explain it. This 
possibility very naturally suggests that there is something that needs 
explaining and, since we cannot explain it, we are left with a mystery. 
The second possible direction is that explanations are somehow logi­
cally inappropriate and that all there is to do is to accept the fact of 
poetic language, but not from want of something better. It is this 
second option that is Wittgenstein's for it is one of his principal con­
tentions that philosophy can on ly describe a use of language and can 
give it no foundations. 
The air of mystery surrounding poetic language results from con­
trasting it with certain other uses of language. I can 't call a man fat 
simply because I am inclined to or claim that planetary motion mani­
fests the same dynamic principles as projectile motion simply because 
it strikes me that way. I am constrained in these cases by criteria of 
varying degrees of stringency in a way that I am not when I find Wed­
nesday fat or the locomotive like a great beast. We don 't want to con­
clude that poetic language is therefore deficient, for it certainly isn 't, 
but on the other hand we can neither explain nor j ustify it by appeal­
ing to a faculty of intuitive knowledge that puts us in contact with 
connections unavailable to the artistically underprivileged. That is 
neither explanation nor justification of anything and only increases 
the sense of mystery. The air of mystery must be dispelled by the real-
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ization that we have here to do with another use of langauge: not an 
improper or deficient use, not somehow a superior use, simply a dif­
ferent use. 
We have the impression that the everyday use of a word such as 
"far" is fully explained because we know its criteria of application. 
And the same is, of course, true for our scientific vocabulary. Witt­
genstein made the point that language cannot be understood in 
abstraction from the human activities and practices in which it is 
embedded and, in addition, he insisted that far from having a single 
use our words and expressions play many different roles and are con­
sequently embedded in many different activities and practices. The 
explanation of the meaning and the criteria of application of an every­
day word such as "fat" as well as of scientific terms takes place within 
the context of that ordinary or scientific usage. We can ask for the 
criteria governing "fat" or "velocity" because there is the activity, on 
the one hand, of describing people like that and, on the other, of 
doing science. What we cannot do, of course, is demand a similar jus­
tification for the general practice of using language either in that ordi­
nary or scientific way. lt is not at all clear what would count, if any­
thing, as explanation or justification for the very existence of a use of 
language with its attendant form of human activity. What we can do is 
to describe the various uses of language and display their role in 
human life. 
This way is open to us with respect to the poetic use of language in 
which words are used with their familiar meanings, but without their 
familiar criteria of application. We can describe this kind of language 
and its relations to other uses of language, everyday or scientific, and 
we can make clear its role in human life, but we cannot explain or jus­
tify it in some larger, metaphysical sense. 
The announced burden of this paper was modest and my conclu­
sion is equally so. Science and poetry are different activities and they 
are not competing for the same prize. There is no logical room, con­
sequently, for a quarrel between them. They do, nevertheless, have 
certain things in common: they can both be creative by way of seeking 
out connections. We have seen, however, that these connections are 
of rather different kinds, their consequences are of different kinds, 
and they play different roles in our lives. We can sort out these sim­
ilarities and differences and describe them and place them in a wider 
range of human interests and practices. This kind of description of the 
language of science and poetry and the activities in which they are 
embedded , which is all that philosophy can provide, dispels mystery 
by denying that there is any mystery to be dispelled. For some this 
conclusion is too modest, indeed disappointing. To those I would 
reply that while philosophy dispels mystery, it does not thereby dispel 
wonder; rather it allows it to be directed at the proper targets by 
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showing that our prosaic uses of Language and our scientific uses of 
language are just as much proper objects of wonder - are j ust as lack­
ing in explanation - as the poetic. If one insists on searching out a 
mystery , don't  seelc it in the fact that there is human activity of this or 
that particular sort, but seek it in the fact that there is human activity 
at all or , better, in the fact that there is something rather than nothing. 
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